Saturday, September 25, 2010
GTA: The City In Speech
Friday, September 24, 2010
Discretion Advised
A perfect world does not, by definition, contain anything bad, and since vices are inherently bad, it follows that in a perfect world there would be no vice. This is the ideal city Plato wishes to create in the Republic. However, vice is a fact of life, both in our world, and in the world in which Plato’s theoretical city is founded. In order to abolish such vice, Plato suggests sanctions regulating citizens’ exposure to content which contains representations of vice. He claims that a man’s actions are based on his observation of the actions of others, stating, “for it is given, I think, only to a few to figure out that the conduct of other people must necessarily influence our own” (Aesthetics 31). One does what one sees others do. Authentic actions observed in others are not the only source of one’s inspiration. Plato contends that dramatic performances as well as all other art, which he collectively considers imitative, influences a person just as strongly. Plato realizes, “the irritable character furnishes a great variety of materials for imitation,” (30) hence such a character is more likely to be dramatically represented. He fears that exposure to works that present such undesirable characters will in turn lead to the development of the same qualities in the populace. On these grounds he concludes, “be justified in refusing to admit [the poet] into a city that is going to be well-governed, because he excites and feeds and strengthens this worthless part of the soul, and thus destroys the rational part” (31). The poet must be censured because his poetry only pollutes the mind with filthy ideas that will influence one’s character for the worst.
While Plato makes a valid point, his idea of censorship appears excessive. We are born helpless, it seems, impressionable babes and we must rely solely on observation to begin making sense of the world. No doctrine of good and evil, virtue and vice behooves us until a parent or guardian, after tangible demonstration (punishment, praise), instills such notions in us. We do not walk out of the womb, as is seen in other creatures; rather we gradually grow accustomed to the world solely by our existing in it. It is for this reason--our initial susceptibility to influence, regardless its quality--which makes pertinent a regulation of exposure. Parents must create an atmosphere conducive to good habits. It is the success at fostering proper judgment in the lad that will grant him the means to determine for himself how to interpret various influences. This is the point of contention. How capable are we, in our personal judgment, to discern good from bad, and especially when it is presented ambiguously in the trash that is pop culture? And further still, how much can we depend on our own judgment, even if we consider it good judgment, to filter out garbage presented in both trend and popular opinion as an accepted norm? This begs the question, what capacity for personal judgment do we actually have if this judgment is itself a product relative to its environment? For example, one person might judge another to be a bad person solely because the latter uses marijuana. Such a judgment relies solely on the influence of an environment in which pot is frowned upon. So it seems that even while we may have a capacity for judgment, not even this is safe from the corruption of influences it is supposed to discern.
So, Plato, I’ll grant you that humans, regardless their disposition or the strength thereof, are irrefutably influenced by their environment, since it seems even our very own judgment derives from the context of real events. If it is the case that we derive our dispositions to judgment from our environment, then, as active participating members of this environment, our judgments should reflect the entire extent of our understanding of our world. That is to say, watching a trashy television program should only influence me in relation to what I have already experienced in the world. Just because I watch Jersey Shore doesn’t mean I’m automatically going to imitate The Situation. I have had enough other influences to balance this one out. However, this is not the case with children who are still impressionable because they have yet to gain a more complete understanding of the world. A child playing a violent videogame—and there are some violent ones out there—will simply not possess the same capacity as an adult for distinguishing reality from its virtual representation.
While representations of life—movies, videogames, epic poetry—influence our experience of the world, Plato seems to exaggerate their magnitude in relation to our lives. Exposure to filth, imitative or otherwise, does not necessitate reciprocation on our part. Our judgment, limited as it may be, does not automatically conclude, “Monkey see, monkey do.” It is completely within our capacity to extrapolate from observation, “Monkey see, and monkey think better of.” It is exactly one’s exposure to the contrary of what he intuits to be right that allows for a personal development of proper judgment. If one is sheltered from vice his whole life, what is he to make of it when it inevitable crosses his path? In a world of inherent vice, censorship only begets ignorance. Instead, the responsibility falls on the parents, guardians, teachers, and mentors to educate impressionable children on the correct way of discerning what the latter are exposed to.
It is not the representation of vice itself, but the context in which this representation is observed which determines its influence. Motion picture ratings for recommended audiences attest to this. A film certified PG suggests parental guidance regarding young viewers. Certain content of this movie is best interpreted under the guidance of an adult. Regarding the particular case involving fines imposed on stores selling videogames to minors, I feel this is less a case of censorship than one of responsibility. The games contain mature content targeted toward audiences that (hopefully) know how to keep their videogame experience in context. Game stores that do not regulate such sales risk polluting impressionable minds with content the latter will not necessarily know how to evaluate properly. I find no objection to minors playing explicit games, given they know enough about the real world as to not let themselves be influenced by such. It is the impressionable youth with their soft, undeveloped skulls with whom we need be concerned. Even then, exposure to vice only amounts to reciprocation if such exposure is not conditioned to be channeled properly through discretion.
Perspectives on Plato's Pop Culture Problem
Alexander Nehemas correctly identifies the parity in reasoning between Plato’s rejection of Epic poetry (among other forms of art) and the proposed ban on violent video games in California. Both are justified in part by the underlying premise that certain forms of representation or art (if one allows violent video games to be classified within this category) pose a possible threat to society and its constituents. Art may reflect life, but according to Plato and certain legislators in California, it is also capable of debasing it, corrupting our attitudes and actions and thus the world in which we live. Prima facie, this similarity between the ancient Greek philosopher and the California governor seems legitimate. Nonetheless, it would be worth providing a sketch of Plato’s account of art to ascertain the extent to which he and Governor Schwarzenegger agree on its possible detrimental effect. It would also be worth considering an opposing view of another ancient Greek philosopher, viz. Aristotle, who would probably oppose the California law or at least reject the main premise of its justification. Finally, one might compare these thinkers to the relatively modern art theorist Clive Bell, who corroborates Aristotle’s suspicion of the importance of representational content in art and even goes so far as to completely renounce it as a determining factor in considering the quality of a work. After surveying all of these thinkers though, there still may remain an unspoken appeal of violent video games in society, which ironically consists in the same reason for which Schwarzenegger wants them banned: violent video games fill us with violent sentiments.
Plato equates the value of art with its utility. He posits that rather than possessing intrinsic value—being good in and of itself, art’s value consists in being good for something else. Within his teleological system of goods, most specific goods ultimately function as a means to obtain the ultimate Good, which for Plato is a specific kind of knowledge. In his Symposium, Plato suggests that art is also a means to this ultimate Good (39). The dialogue focuses not on art but its object, beauty. Beauty is defined as a peculiar form us desire; unlike most desires, our appetite for beautiful objects is not appeased by our acquisition of them. As a result of this insatiable quality, we learn that beautiful objects are not that which we seek, but rather, as Plato explains, the form of beauty alone and not specific instances of it is the appropriate object of our desire. Once we recognize the true nature of beauty, we are inclined to recognize its relation to knowledge and the Good, after which we realize that these final goods are what we truly desire. Art then is valuable as a guide in our search of knowledge and the Good. It is for this reason that Plato advocates censorship of certain art in the Republic (31). For ‘bad art’, which neither participates in nor directs us towards the form of beauty, will in turn be unable to aide us in our search of the Good. Indeed, ‘bad art’ will have the opposite effect on us, instilling us with poor virtues and preventing us from pursuing the good, leading us farther astray.
It’s questionable whether governor Schwartzenegger would commit to the view that violent video games inhibit us from pursuing knowledge and the ultimate human good. Nevertheless, he would probably assent to Plato’s claim that representations of improper ethical behavior dispose us to developing inferior ethical values ourselves. It may be asked, however, to what extent we are susceptible to the negative influence of representation in our culture. Nehamas himself poses the question but leaves it unanswered, or at least doesn’t answer explicitly. He expresses apprehension over the possibility that we might in fact be substantially affected by such influence. Yet he doesn’t elaborate, suggesting that he may feel this possibility is not actually the case. Indeed, some philosophers would overtly deny the underlying assumption of both Plato’s account of art and Schwarzenegger’s proposal to censor violent video games. Aristotle, a student of Plato, would deny the purported bleak consequences produced by negative representations in our culture.
Aristotle would reject this premise because, unlike Plato, he denies the significance of the representational content in art. That is, although he conceives of art as both representation and pedagogical accoutrement, as does Plato, Aristotle differs from Plato in his dismissal of the relation between the artwork and the object the artwork purports to represent. For Aristotle, bad representation in art doesn’t pose a threat to society because society isn’t or certainly shouldn’t be concerned about the content of the representation. Form, not content, determines the success or failure of art (Poetics 48). It is thus possible that an artwork depict vile characters performing acts considered anathema by the ethical community, but if these characters interacted in such a way within the framework of the story so as to reveal universal truth about life, one would rightly consider the artwork a success. To remark upon the deplorable qualities of the characters would be to misunderstand the noteworthy elements of the work. The characters are unessential let alone worthy of attention that might lead to an adoption of their traits. As a result, we would, or should only be (positively) affected by the plot, as this is what relates the most valuable or substantial element of the work. Specifically, it relates universal laws or principles. Aristotle recognizes that this kind of knowledge does not derive from particulars, but rather it derives from the relationship between particulars; the qualities of the particulars themselves are substantially less significant. This is how metaphor functions (52). We identify X as Y, not because they share identical traits but because they are united by universals in such a way that they seem comparable. Aristotle recognizes the role of metaphor in art, whereas Plato does not. Plato seems to believe that our knowledge of an artwork derives from the likeness of the representation to the object represented. Under this conception, we take our lessons not from the relations expressed within the content but the content itself. It follows then from this view that if the content of a work consists of moral turpitude, the knowledge we take from it will be tarnished in that light. Aristotle rejects this view.
Aristotle, though, probably wouldn’t extol violent video games. He might not label them as hazardous to the moral education of our youth, but he also (probably) wouldn’t recognize these video games as good art. In evaluating them, rather than inquire about the violence conveyed within, he would consider the plot. Do the stories of these games reveal the universal laws and principles that govern us? An affirmative answer seems unlikely. However, there are examples of violent stories that are successful in this regard. The title character of Shakespeare’s Macbeth is bloody and ruthless, as are a number of other characters in this macabre play, and yet the universal themes contained within the work (e.g. the corrupting power of unchecked ambition) render it a successful piece of art. If the video games were able to establish plots to similar effect, Aristotle would not reject them as ‘bad art’, but he would do so with one qualification. That is, consummate weaving of plot may qualify them as ‘good art’ but they would be better art if they achieved this and the content within the plot was non-violent. Aristotle thus concedes that representation does hold some importance, as virtuous or otherwise positive representation content qualifies a work as that of a higher form (55). There is, however, at least one modern aesthetic theorist would take issue with this qualification.
Clive Bell shares Aristotle’s view that form conquers content in determining factors of good art. Yet he would insist that representational content is completely inconsequential. Art moves us because its form possesses ineffable yet universal qualities that evoke an aesthetic sentiment in us (266). This is the only (albeit monumental) effect art enacts upon us. Representational content, like a violent character for instance, simply lacks the power to influence us the way that form does. Like Aristotle, Bell would probably doubt that video games could possess the appropriate form required to move us in this specific way, but it is possible. He differs from Aristotle in that, it were conceded that video games did in fact possess such form, he would be required to grant these video games the same artistic status that he would any other objet d’art whose excellence of form was paramount.
What all of these thinkers (and the proponents of the California ban) seem to clearly dismiss is the possibility of art having a detrimental yet legitimate effect upon us. Plato and Aristotle posit that art can (or should) only affect us positively. That is, art educates us, which is proper and good. Bell lends credence to art as a catalyst of emotion so positive he relates the sentiment to experiencing ecstasy. And of course, Schwarzenegger wants to ban video games because they might be detrimental to youth. But can some good art affect us negatively; can its goodness be derived paradoxically from how it makes us bad? I don’t think we should immediately dismiss an affirmative answer to this question. Searching for a corroborating example, I’m inclined to think of certain works by Jean-Michel Basquiat, the Brooklyn-born painter and graffiti artist who came to prominence in the early 1980’s in New York. The crass scribbling of his naïve expressionist paintings and murals might qualify as art in a few ways. They represent, with eerie precision, a certain malaise present amid the New York under-class culture at the time. In this way they are educational (under Aristotle’s view), relating certain universal laws about class, modern urban life, and the human condition. But the truths these works reveal are dour if not devastating. Instead of inspiring sentiments of ecstasy (as Bell would demand), what one gathers from the works moves her to hopelessness and despair. And yet, no one appreciative of art would want to be displaced from a Basquiat, despite or indeed because of its powerful negative influence. Perhaps this shows that we don’t necessarily require art to move us to good, but simply that is moves us. The proponent of violent video games might make such an appeal. Perhaps video games do fill us with a passionate destructive rage, but this is precisely what we want from the representations we surround ourselves with in daily life. We may well want to be moved to be good, but this doesn’t mean we don’t also want to be moved to be bad.
Video Games As An Art?
As it seems now, violent video games have become an uncanny source for blame. Proponents of censorship attack video games for their over-the-top depiction of violence and demand that such games not be accessible to our youth. The argument goes something like this: since violent video games depict acts of brutality, revenge, and other such vices, they inadvertently encourage such behavior in those who play the games. This far-fetched argument, however, and is hardly true.
To reiterate what Kip stated in his post, perhaps at first glance Plato would embrace a similar mentality of blame towards this form of “art”. Plato writes, “for it is given, I think, only to a few to figure out that the conduct of other people must necessarily influence our own, and that it is no easy matter, after feeding the strength of the principle of pity upon the sufferings of others, to keep it under restraint when we suffer” (Plato, 31). Here Plato wishes to advances the argument that those capable of seeing art’s destructive potential must oblige themselves to the censoring of such art. The problem with this claim, however, brings into question the “few” who are responsible for the censoring of such art. If society relies upon the opinions of those who claim that violent video games are the source of violent behavior, then how do we strike a balance between those who find it offensive and those who do not?
Nehamas suggest in his article that accusing violent video games as a source for violent behavior is considered by scholars “only as the result of ‘bad or irrelevant research, muddleheaded thinking and unfounded, simplistic news reports’” (Nehamas). Thus, we see there are two sides to the story between those who condemn violence in video games and those remain receptive to this particular form of “art”. The issue is hence two-fold: the first of which begin that, if video games are actually the source of violent behavior, then should they be censored? And secondly, who are the “few”, as Plato puts it, that are responsible for determining censorship, particularly if there is division even amongst the “few”?
In order to examine this problem furthermore, it is important first of all to give a proper representation of the art in question. Arguably (as according to my limited knowledge of gaming), violent video games are produced, developed, and sold for a single purpose: to depict a fanciful or, in some cases, real-life scenario involving a hero who must overcome the trials of evil, even at the cost of violently slaughtering every foe who might have the misfortunate of crossing paths with this him. In part, this provides the gamer with a false sense of accomplishment; as he/she lives vicariously through the necessary violent life of the game’s hero. Hence the purpose of most violent video games is not to depict a reality of all serial killers, but rather construct a world where you, as the gamer, prevail as the hero. However, this very point remains a problem for Plato.
In book X of the Republic, Nehamas notes Plato’s example of Achilles as misrepresentation of art. Homer portrayal Achilles character as being equally full of vice as he is virtue is problematic for Plato because the audience is led to sympathize with Achilles at the end of the Iliad, despite the untamed, violent nature of Homer’s hero. Thus Plato attacks this form of poetry as misrepresentation of the good and subsequently qualifies it as a form of art worthy of censorship.
Conversely, Aristotle finds hope in characters like Achilles for the cathartic sensation they impart upon the audience. In the Poetics, Aristotle defines what calls a cathartic experience, where the audience departs from the art with a feeling of emotional contentment. This contentment, however, does not result from the hero who always chooses to do the right thing, but rather, from the character who recognizes his error and embraces a willingness to redeem himself. If we make an Aristotelian comparison to modern video games, we can see a certain cathartic element in today’s most popularly condemned gaming series, “Grand Theft Auto”. At the end of one of the GTA installments, the main character is forced with a decision to either remain loyal to his family or to continue living the violent life to which he has become accustomed. Fortunately, the plot concludes with the hero abandoning his violent life for the tranquility of community and family. Thus, one could argue that even today’s most equally hated and loved game exudes some redeeming elements.
Yet does Aristotle’s cathartic experience help vindicate the mass production violent video games and their availability courtesy of our local “Game Stop”? Perhaps it should, but perhaps, more importantly, the “few” who condemn violent video games for their alleged influence on the youth ought to take a stronger stand against the pervasiveness of negligent and abusive parents. Put frankly, accusing video games for producing a violent youth excuses the responsibility of parents and the community who, in my opinion, are responsible for fostering a child to become more discerning in his behavior.
Additionally, those concerned with censorship should pressure the gaming industry into taking more initiative to produce games that are more artistic and less simplistic. The same must be true with all forms of art. The biggest problem with the gaming industry is how often it targets an audience that is susceptible to their base, carnal desires. Obviously, kids are going to continue playing video games that contain violence at catastrophic levels. Thus, the gaming industry – like the film and music industry – should be less concerned with what sells, and more concerned with the creative process and skill that help construct the piece of art.
Finally, to answer the question of video game censorship, I find Aristotle’s interpretation of art most convincing. If we as a society want to produce good art, then we must focus upon the relationship between the art and the artist. This means overlooking what may appear to be a direct consequence of the art (i.e. video games encourage violent behavior), instead paying more attention to the creativity involved in producing such art. Although this does not vindicate all violent video games, it does promote a more moderate approach. If games like GTA are capable giving the audience cathartic experience, then perhaps I find their censorship simply inexcusable.

