Kantian Considerations of Sneakers as Art

Nike, the multi-national sporting goods corporation, recently released the Nike Dunk Mid Premium SB [ARMY/ORNG BLAZE]. The skateboard sneaker, known under the more palatable moniker ‘Real Tree’ by the urban au courant, will likely be consumed by skateboarder, cultural connoisseur, and layman alike, but will anyone be rightfully able to label this shoe a beautiful work of art?

Athletic footwear admittedly serves a functional purpose, but this doesn’t prohibit us from appreciating its occasional achievement of aesthetic form. Does it? Instinctively, i.e. uncorrupted by philosophical consideration, I would call Real Trees a beautiful pair of sneakers. But Kantian conditions loom skeptically, inching their way into the foreground of my judgment. Does the mere representation of these kicks perk my interest, or is there also an implicit possibility of the actual shoes on my feet motivating my judgment. If it’s the latter, then according to Kant, I’m not really justified in calling the shoes beautiful, as my judgment is interested. That is, I’m saying something about the actual existence of the shoes and their relation to my specific interests rather than something about their aesthetic qualities. Presumably, when one is attracted to footwear, one’s interest is predicated on the actual existence of the shoe. It seems that sneakers interest us to the extent that they can be put on, laced up, and increase athletic performance.

The Real Trees, however, fulfill the disinterested requirement. I don’t have any intention of purchasing them. I don’t skateboard. They would also look rather silly on me. (Indeed, anyone sporting them would look a little silly). When I look at the shoes then, my judgment is purely reflective of their representation and not of the shoes themselves. As a result, when I put forth something to the effect of ‘Those Real Trees are a beautiful pair of Shoes’, I’m not making a claim about an actual pair of shoes. This may seem bizarre but only if one neglects my complete indifference to the possibility of the shoes being worn (by anyone). If the pleasure gained from the Real Tree’s doesn’t entail them being worn, then the shoes themselves are superfluous; I require only their representation to take pleasure in them. I wouldn’t be disappointed if a single pair hadn’t been produced, and I was in fact simply admiring a designer’s rejected blueprint for a prototype.

Because the pleasure I take in the Real Trees are not derived from my relation to any actual shoe, and is thus disinterested, I expect everyone to experience a similar pleasure when coming across them. Why should the shoes evoke a particular sentiment in me but not others when my enjoyment is in no way related to my personal relation to them? If there’s nothing in particular about me that accounts for the pleasure produced by the Real Trees, it stands that everyone should receive pleasure from them. It would be unreasonable to expect everyone to appreciate the quality of a Lotto soccer cleat, a Redwing hiking boot or an Alexander McQueen stiletto. These require the admirer already be invested in a particular field of interest. They require a previously developed passion for soccer, camping or fashion. For one only appreciates them as they apply to tastes one has already acquired, and taste, such as one’s taste for Italian Serie A Soccer or one’s taste for Givenchy, lack the expectation of universal accord. On the other hand, appreciating the Real Trees requires no prior acquired taste. One need not be well versed in skateboard or urban-fashion culture. Consequently, their beauty could be, indeed should be, felt by anyone and everyone. This expectation of universal assent, Kant’s second condition of beauty, is therefore also fulfilled by the Real Trees.

It may seem unusual to expect everyone to agree on the beauty of a pair of sneakers, even if the liking I take to them is disinterested. Or perhaps, one might demand how my judgment of the sneakers could be disinterested. How could I take pleasure in the mere representation of shoes with no regard for their actual existence in the world? This is rare. What is it about these shoes that makes my judgment disinterested, whereas my liking of (presumably most of) the shoes I own is not purely aesthetic in nature. Here’s my Kantian hypothesis: Real Trees evoke a certain purposiveness. The camouflage print circumscribed by bright orange trim suggests that they were designed for hunting purposes. Clearly though, Nike SB’s are not hunting shoes; no one is going to be trekking through wetland with a bloodhound and a rifle sporting Nikes. SB’s aren’t for hunting but for skating. And yet, this specific model doesn’t seem quite appropriate, as it doesn’t seem to cater to the taste of urban skaters. The shoes then, one might posit, are a sartorial accessory, a manifestation of modern fashion. But even this doesn’t seem quite right. What moderately stylish person would want to don themselves in orange camo? Real Trees burgeon with purposiveness yet simultaneously seem to wilt just before any actual purpose can be identified. This perpetual chase for purpose, this unrequited promise of an end is what so tantalizes our sensibilities, the result of which is the sensation of aesthetic pleasure.

Kant’s final movement or condition of beauty stipulates that the beautiful object not merely happen to be beautiful but be necessarily so. If one concedes, however, the preceding condition, that is finality without end, then it seems that Real Trees must necessarily be beautiful. For finality consists of an intricate interaction between a rational actors cognitive powers, specifically imagination and understanding. One’s imagination, the power to construct or map sense perceptions, takes in sense data of an external object and construes the object as a representation. Simultaneously, one’s understanding, the power to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions or concepts, attempts to file this representation under a concept, part of which contains that for which the object was made, its end. Because the Real Trees convey finality, one begins to submit the representation of the shoes under a concept, but because an actual purpose of the object of the representation of the shoes is never identified, the shoes are never actually submitted to a concept. Kant refers to this as a quickening or free play between the imagination and the understanding. This perpetual back and forth or stagnating flux of the Real Trees between representation and concept is the mechanism by which we experience the shoes as beautiful. Because this mechanism consists of a relation of rational powers, any rational agent will experience Real Trees as beautiful; their beauty is a necessary result of the functioning of one’s rational powers.

It seems then that all of Kant’s conditions for beauty obtain in the case of the Real Trees. Kicks as art? Doesn’t seem out of the question for a Kantian.

Thinking Pictures

The movie "Temple Grandin" raises several issues related to the field of Aesthetics. Temple was diagnosed with Autism at age four. Her perception of the world differs from others; she thinks in pictures. On one hand, this movie depicts the diversity of human experience to such an extent that it is almost sublime. If one person’s experience of what seems to be the same world can differ so radically from my own, then what’s considered normal seems almost contrived. In fact, we really have very little idea what’s going on in the mind of even our closest friend. Speech, or more generally, language, offers a medium to convey ideas. What may be regarding as one’s consciousness are the words he thinks to himself. He may impute his thoughts onto others in as much as the latter can deduce these thoughts from the worlds he chooses to represent and convey them. Hence, language provides a means to understanding others’ thoughts. For whatever reason, Temple thinks in pictures. This gives her a better understanding of science but because she thinks differently than others, she is socially awkward. Several times in the movie, someone said something which she pictured literally in her mind, often with comical results. Thinking in pictures doesn’t pose an inherent problem; Temple aptly demonstrates this in her mastership of mechanics. However, a problem does arise in that it is difficult to convey these visual thoughts. One can speak what’s on one’s mind only insofar as these thoughts conform to his language. If a person is not already thinking linguistically then talking becomes much more of a conscious effort. We speak and interact naturally because even when we are not speaking there is a dialogue constantly going on inside our head. If this dialogue is absent, then when one is prompted to speak, words must then be called to mind. I relate this to speaking a foreign language. But because Temple demonstrates command of language in speaking she must have the capacity to think it. Ultimately, no matter what your condition, it is impossible to get into the mind of others. Temple’s autism is just an example of how diverse individual thinking can be.

GTA: The City In Speech

In the republic Socrates when talking about the guardians who will be appointed to protect the city will be educated. He says that they should be not only physically trained but also mentally trained through the use of music. With music they will be trained by the stories contained there in to understand not only what behavior is agreeable to society, but also their role in the polis should be. Socrates makes this clear when he says, "We first begin by telling stories to children?And surely they are false on the whole, though they have some truth in them(Republic 377a5). Socrates notes that these stories used to teach the children will "on the whole" be false, but also contain an element of truth. This concept of the false story with true elements used for the purposes of teaching will later be labeled by Socrates as, "the noble lie". For example, a noble lie that is popular among contemporary american house holds would be, something like Santa Clause: telling a child that if they are good once a year they will get gifts from a seasonal deity, but if they are bad that same deity will punish them. Therefore to Socrates the story is merely a vehicle to impressing upon children that if they obey rules they will be rewarded, and if they break them they will suffer negative consequences.

But, this hits on something that Socrates just talked about a few lines back, I.e., the "noble lie". While Socrates qualifies this lie by saying that it is noble, this does not make it any less oriented towards truth. True the ultimate goal of the noble lie is to impress upon children lesson that will help socioty. But, is it right to violate the societal standard of what is socially acceptable to teach children those same lessons? Essentially what we have is a lie told for the purpose of keeping children from lying. Socrates himself says that lying, through stories, is the only way to impose moral lessons on children from such an early age. But, in the process of educating these children the teacher would be breaking the law of the city in speech. Thus we have a new predicament: is lying ok if it is for the good of the city?

Though the article from The New York Times is one revolved around violence in video games and the possible manifestation of violent actions in children through being exposed to that medium, it seems to me that the issue becomes not only wether we sensor and commit hypocrisy. But, also wether we judge for someone else whether or not they are mentally capable of interpreting art for themselves.

This issue regards adults discerning what is and isn't acceptable material for them to be influenced by.In the case of children I agree that there should be censorship. I think we can all agree that a child does not for himself have the ability to discern between what parts of a story he is told are and are not metaphorical. We all see this. This is why children are crushed when we tell them after that Santa clause isn't really. Why? Because when we told them the story of the man in the red suit, they were not able to discern what part of the story was true and what was not. As adults we can see that the grain of truth to the story was that presents arrive on Dec.25 if you are good, and if you are bad they do not. But, for a child they have no ability to distinguish between the parts of the story that are super furious and the parts that are factually valid. For this reason, as we all know, we keep the truth hidden behind lies for children so that they might understand them.

However I see this issue as being one of censorship among adults being of a different nature. While children are not able to discern between the moral lesson in a story and the actions in a story, adults are able to. Adults are conditioned to being told lies through out their lives. Sometimes these lies involve truth, sometimes they do not. But, in stories moral lessons are almost always inherent. Since this is the case, most adults are able to draw the moral lesson out of a tale, without being duped by the fictional details.

In the case of video games there is already a rating system in place to keep a person of an inappropriate age from purchasing it. Since this is the case, it is just as difficult for a child to be exposed to a video game beyond their years as it would be for them to access any other from of media that they are not mature enough to handle. Therefore this question is not one of protecting impressionable young minds from violent media. It is a question of wether we should protect adult autonomous agents from themselves. I say themselves, because of what has already implicitly but not directly been stated : that it is not the media that imposes these moral lessons on people it is that persons own interpretation of the media. As before the issue is almost a guessing game of how different aspects of the media will influence a particular individual. Two people could watch the same violent act and one could understand the connection between the violent act and punishment. The other could miss the connection entirely, Or make a correlation that was unintended by the creator. Such as violence in a video game leading to a benefit or a reward.

With this in mind, it truly seems only like a guessing game for the censor. He must attempt to censor what he believes the censor-e could potentially make the wrong correlation between.This is exactly why we censor media that is geared towards children, and do not censor that media for adults. Adults are able to make the correct correlation between two correct concepts in media, and for themselves make a cause effect correlation. But, children have not yet had it impressed upon them that some actions warrant praise and some actions decent.

According to Socrates then it seems to be of little consequence the content of the media, as long as the message, or the end result on the subject is the correct one. And this can be seen again in the Republic. Socrates has already said that it is the goal of the story to impress upon children societal lessons. One of these lessons is lying. On line 389c Socrates commands, "So, if [anyone] is caught telling lies in the city... he will be punished for introducing a practice that is a subversive and destructive of a city as of a ship."In this way Socrates notes that for a citizen to lie to his ruler is as if a patient lied to his doctor. Of course this could lead to the doctor giving the patient the wrong treatment and possibly hurting himFor example if there is violence and cursing, and all sorts of other socially disagreeable content in media so be it, as long as the message is trill right. Since the original article takes the example of the video game “Grand theft auto” I will use it as my example. FOr those that do not engage in this form of media, “Grand Theft Auto” is what is commonly referred to as a “sand box” style video game. This sub-genre receives its name quite simply from the plastic box that is filled with sand. Essentially the idea is that within only the confines of the the game the player can do anything and everything that one might choose to. As the protagonist of the game the player can choose to commit any number of crimes or societally detrimental acts. This seems to be the sticking point for the former Governor.

Therefore with all of the facts considered, it would seem to me that Socrates would perfectly fine with "Grand Theft Auto" being sold and enjoyed by the citizens of the city in speech. As it is being viewed by an audience that is able to discern for themselves the correct correlation between events in the game. As well as the fact that the events in the game have appropriate consequences. Which seems to me Socrates main concern with any form of media.

Discretion Advised

A perfect world does not, by definition, contain anything bad, and since vices are inherently bad, it follows that in a perfect world there would be no vice. This is the ideal city Plato wishes to create in the Republic. However, vice is a fact of life, both in our world, and in the world in which Plato’s theoretical city is founded. In order to abolish such vice, Plato suggests sanctions regulating citizens’ exposure to content which contains representations of vice. He claims that a man’s actions are based on his observation of the actions of others, stating, “for it is given, I think, only to a few to figure out that the conduct of other people must necessarily influence our own” (Aesthetics 31). One does what one sees others do. Authentic actions observed in others are not the only source of one’s inspiration. Plato contends that dramatic performances as well as all other art, which he collectively considers imitative, influences a person just as strongly. Plato realizes, “the irritable character furnishes a great variety of materials for imitation,” (30) hence such a character is more likely to be dramatically represented. He fears that exposure to works that present such undesirable characters will in turn lead to the development of the same qualities in the populace. On these grounds he concludes, “be justified in refusing to admit [the poet] into a city that is going to be well-governed, because he excites and feeds and strengthens this worthless part of the soul, and thus destroys the rational part” (31). The poet must be censured because his poetry only pollutes the mind with filthy ideas that will influence one’s character for the worst.

While Plato makes a valid point, his idea of censorship appears excessive. We are born helpless, it seems, impressionable babes and we must rely solely on observation to begin making sense of the world. No doctrine of good and evil, virtue and vice behooves us until a parent or guardian, after tangible demonstration (punishment, praise), instills such notions in us. We do not walk out of the womb, as is seen in other creatures; rather we gradually grow accustomed to the world solely by our existing in it. It is for this reason--our initial susceptibility to influence, regardless its quality--which makes pertinent a regulation of exposure. Parents must create an atmosphere conducive to good habits. It is the success at fostering proper judgment in the lad that will grant him the means to determine for himself how to interpret various influences. This is the point of contention. How capable are we, in our personal judgment, to discern good from bad, and especially when it is presented ambiguously in the trash that is pop culture? And further still, how much can we depend on our own judgment, even if we consider it good judgment, to filter out garbage presented in both trend and popular opinion as an accepted norm? This begs the question, what capacity for personal judgment do we actually have if this judgment is itself a product relative to its environment? For example, one person might judge another to be a bad person solely because the latter uses marijuana. Such a judgment relies solely on the influence of an environment in which pot is frowned upon. So it seems that even while we may have a capacity for judgment, not even this is safe from the corruption of influences it is supposed to discern.

So, Plato, I’ll grant you that humans, regardless their disposition or the strength thereof, are irrefutably influenced by their environment, since it seems even our very own judgment derives from the context of real events. If it is the case that we derive our dispositions to judgment from our environment, then, as active participating members of this environment, our judgments should reflect the entire extent of our understanding of our world. That is to say, watching a trashy television program should only influence me in relation to what I have already experienced in the world. Just because I watch Jersey Shore doesn’t mean I’m automatically going to imitate The Situation. I have had enough other influences to balance this one out. However, this is not the case with children who are still impressionable because they have yet to gain a more complete understanding of the world. A child playing a violent videogame—and there are some violent ones out there—will simply not possess the same capacity as an adult for distinguishing reality from its virtual representation.

While representations of life—movies, videogames, epic poetry—influence our experience of the world, Plato seems to exaggerate their magnitude in relation to our lives. Exposure to filth, imitative or otherwise, does not necessitate reciprocation on our part. Our judgment, limited as it may be, does not automatically conclude, “Monkey see, monkey do.” It is completely within our capacity to extrapolate from observation, “Monkey see, and monkey think better of.” It is exactly one’s exposure to the contrary of what he intuits to be right that allows for a personal development of proper judgment. If one is sheltered from vice his whole life, what is he to make of it when it inevitable crosses his path? In a world of inherent vice, censorship only begets ignorance. Instead, the responsibility falls on the parents, guardians, teachers, and mentors to educate impressionable children on the correct way of discerning what the latter are exposed to.

It is not the representation of vice itself, but the context in which this representation is observed which determines its influence. Motion picture ratings for recommended audiences attest to this. A film certified PG suggests parental guidance regarding young viewers. Certain content of this movie is best interpreted under the guidance of an adult. Regarding the particular case involving fines imposed on stores selling videogames to minors, I feel this is less a case of censorship than one of responsibility. The games contain mature content targeted toward audiences that (hopefully) know how to keep their videogame experience in context. Game stores that do not regulate such sales risk polluting impressionable minds with content the latter will not necessarily know how to evaluate properly. I find no objection to minors playing explicit games, given they know enough about the real world as to not let themselves be influenced by such. It is the impressionable youth with their soft, undeveloped skulls with whom we need be concerned. Even then, exposure to vice only amounts to reciprocation if such exposure is not conditioned to be channeled properly through discretion.

Perspectives on Plato's Pop Culture Problem

Alexander Nehemas correctly identifies the parity in reasoning between Plato’s rejection of Epic poetry (among other forms of art) and the proposed ban on violent video games in California. Both are justified in part by the underlying premise that certain forms of representation or art (if one allows violent video games to be classified within this category) pose a possible threat to society and its constituents. Art may reflect life, but according to Plato and certain legislators in California, it is also capable of debasing it, corrupting our attitudes and actions and thus the world in which we live. Prima facie, this similarity between the ancient Greek philosopher and the California governor seems legitimate. Nonetheless, it would be worth providing a sketch of Plato’s account of art to ascertain the extent to which he and Governor Schwarzenegger agree on its possible detrimental effect. It would also be worth considering an opposing view of another ancient Greek philosopher, viz. Aristotle, who would probably oppose the California law or at least reject the main premise of its justification. Finally, one might compare these thinkers to the relatively modern art theorist Clive Bell, who corroborates Aristotle’s suspicion of the importance of representational content in art and even goes so far as to completely renounce it as a determining factor in considering the quality of a work. After surveying all of these thinkers though, there still may remain an unspoken appeal of violent video games in society, which ironically consists in the same reason for which Schwarzenegger wants them banned: violent video games fill us with violent sentiments.

Plato equates the value of art with its utility. He posits that rather than possessing intrinsic value—being good in and of itself, art’s value consists in being good for something else. Within his teleological system of goods, most specific goods ultimately function as a means to obtain the ultimate Good, which for Plato is a specific kind of knowledge. In his Symposium, Plato suggests that art is also a means to this ultimate Good (39). The dialogue focuses not on art but its object, beauty. Beauty is defined as a peculiar form us desire; unlike most desires, our appetite for beautiful objects is not appeased by our acquisition of them. As a result of this insatiable quality, we learn that beautiful objects are not that which we seek, but rather, as Plato explains, the form of beauty alone and not specific instances of it is the appropriate object of our desire. Once we recognize the true nature of beauty, we are inclined to recognize its relation to knowledge and the Good, after which we realize that these final goods are what we truly desire. Art then is valuable as a guide in our search of knowledge and the Good. It is for this reason that Plato advocates censorship of certain art in the Republic (31). For ‘bad art’, which neither participates in nor directs us towards the form of beauty, will in turn be unable to aide us in our search of the Good. Indeed, ‘bad art’ will have the opposite effect on us, instilling us with poor virtues and preventing us from pursuing the good, leading us farther astray.

It’s questionable whether governor Schwartzenegger would commit to the view that violent video games inhibit us from pursuing knowledge and the ultimate human good. Nevertheless, he would probably assent to Plato’s claim that representations of improper ethical behavior dispose us to developing inferior ethical values ourselves. It may be asked, however, to what extent we are susceptible to the negative influence of representation in our culture. Nehamas himself poses the question but leaves it unanswered, or at least doesn’t answer explicitly. He expresses apprehension over the possibility that we might in fact be substantially affected by such influence. Yet he doesn’t elaborate, suggesting that he may feel this possibility is not actually the case. Indeed, some philosophers would overtly deny the underlying assumption of both Plato’s account of art and Schwarzenegger’s proposal to censor violent video games. Aristotle, a student of Plato, would deny the purported bleak consequences produced by negative representations in our culture.

Aristotle would reject this premise because, unlike Plato, he denies the significance of the representational content in art. That is, although he conceives of art as both representation and pedagogical accoutrement, as does Plato, Aristotle differs from Plato in his dismissal of the relation between the artwork and the object the artwork purports to represent. For Aristotle, bad representation in art doesn’t pose a threat to society because society isn’t or certainly shouldn’t be concerned about the content of the representation. Form, not content, determines the success or failure of art (Poetics 48). It is thus possible that an artwork depict vile characters performing acts considered anathema by the ethical community, but if these characters interacted in such a way within the framework of the story so as to reveal universal truth about life, one would rightly consider the artwork a success. To remark upon the deplorable qualities of the characters would be to misunderstand the noteworthy elements of the work. The characters are unessential let alone worthy of attention that might lead to an adoption of their traits. As a result, we would, or should only be (positively) affected by the plot, as this is what relates the most valuable or substantial element of the work. Specifically, it relates universal laws or principles. Aristotle recognizes that this kind of knowledge does not derive from particulars, but rather it derives from the relationship between particulars; the qualities of the particulars themselves are substantially less significant. This is how metaphor functions (52). We identify X as Y, not because they share identical traits but because they are united by universals in such a way that they seem comparable. Aristotle recognizes the role of metaphor in art, whereas Plato does not. Plato seems to believe that our knowledge of an artwork derives from the likeness of the representation to the object represented. Under this conception, we take our lessons not from the relations expressed within the content but the content itself. It follows then from this view that if the content of a work consists of moral turpitude, the knowledge we take from it will be tarnished in that light. Aristotle rejects this view.

Aristotle, though, probably wouldn’t extol violent video games. He might not label them as hazardous to the moral education of our youth, but he also (probably) wouldn’t recognize these video games as good art. In evaluating them, rather than inquire about the violence conveyed within, he would consider the plot. Do the stories of these games reveal the universal laws and principles that govern us? An affirmative answer seems unlikely. However, there are examples of violent stories that are successful in this regard. The title character of Shakespeare’s Macbeth is bloody and ruthless, as are a number of other characters in this macabre play, and yet the universal themes contained within the work (e.g. the corrupting power of unchecked ambition) render it a successful piece of art. If the video games were able to establish plots to similar effect, Aristotle would not reject them as ‘bad art’, but he would do so with one qualification. That is, consummate weaving of plot may qualify them as ‘good art’ but they would be better art if they achieved this and the content within the plot was non-violent. Aristotle thus concedes that representation does hold some importance, as virtuous or otherwise positive representation content qualifies a work as that of a higher form (55). There is, however, at least one modern aesthetic theorist would take issue with this qualification.

Clive Bell shares Aristotle’s view that form conquers content in determining factors of good art. Yet he would insist that representational content is completely inconsequential. Art moves us because its form possesses ineffable yet universal qualities that evoke an aesthetic sentiment in us (266). This is the only (albeit monumental) effect art enacts upon us. Representational content, like a violent character for instance, simply lacks the power to influence us the way that form does. Like Aristotle, Bell would probably doubt that video games could possess the appropriate form required to move us in this specific way, but it is possible. He differs from Aristotle in that, it were conceded that video games did in fact possess such form, he would be required to grant these video games the same artistic status that he would any other objet d’art whose excellence of form was paramount.

What all of these thinkers (and the proponents of the California ban) seem to clearly dismiss is the possibility of art having a detrimental yet legitimate effect upon us. Plato and Aristotle posit that art can (or should) only affect us positively. That is, art educates us, which is proper and good. Bell lends credence to art as a catalyst of emotion so positive he relates the sentiment to experiencing ecstasy. And of course, Schwarzenegger wants to ban video games because they might be detrimental to youth. But can some good art affect us negatively; can its goodness be derived paradoxically from how it makes us bad? I don’t think we should immediately dismiss an affirmative answer to this question. Searching for a corroborating example, I’m inclined to think of certain works by Jean-Michel Basquiat, the Brooklyn-born painter and graffiti artist who came to prominence in the early 1980’s in New York. The crass scribbling of his naïve expressionist paintings and murals might qualify as art in a few ways. They represent, with eerie precision, a certain malaise present amid the New York under-class culture at the time. In this way they are educational (under Aristotle’s view), relating certain universal laws about class, modern urban life, and the human condition. But the truths these works reveal are dour if not devastating. Instead of inspiring sentiments of ecstasy (as Bell would demand), what one gathers from the works moves her to hopelessness and despair. And yet, no one appreciative of art would want to be displaced from a Basquiat, despite or indeed because of its powerful negative influence. Perhaps this shows that we don’t necessarily require art to move us to good, but simply that is moves us. The proponent of violent video games might make such an appeal. Perhaps video games do fill us with a passionate destructive rage, but this is precisely what we want from the representations we surround ourselves with in daily life. We may well want to be moved to be good, but this doesn’t mean we don’t also want to be moved to be bad.